Application was made on behalf of Colonel Rhodes, Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, and FitzPatrick for release on bail, upon the grounds that no distinction whatever had been made between them and the other prisoners who had already been released, but this was refused after the point had been reserved for consideration by the State Attorney in consultation with the Chief Justice, and the four men returned to their former conditions of imprisonment.  Mr. Chamberlain continued to make representations on behalf of these men, and at one time it appeared as though the restrictions would be removed, Dr. Coster having pledged himself to accept bail, and having actually drawn out the bail-bonds and submitted them to the solicitors of the accused for approval, and every arrangement having been completed—­even to the finding of the additional security.  They were however at the last moment curtly informed that bail would not be allowed.  On this being reported to Mr. Chamberlain, he at once replied to the effect that he could not believe that a Government would revoke a promise made on their behalf by the State Attorney.  Dr. Leyds, on behalf of his Government, stated that the matter was in the hands of the State Attorney alone and did not concern the Executive, and that on inquiry he found that no such promise had been made and no undertaking given.  The incident is more or less trivial, but again shows the readiness with which the Boer Government repudiate a promise when it is to their convenience to do so.  Dr. Coster on his side admitted with expressions of regret that there had been a breach of undertaking, and stated that it had been done by order of the Executive Council.

Communications between Mr. Chamberlain and the Pretoria Government were of great frequency during this period.  The phantom of Mr. Kruger’s visit to England was chased with great assiduity.  The wily old President seized on Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestions as an excellent pretext for delay to enable him to spread his nets, and he used the time to great advantage.  But this was not the worst!  Mr. Chamberlain’s new diplomacy and his stupid or treacherous advisers led him into blunders; as when, for instance, he tried to bounce without the intention of making good his implied threats; and when he sent his 4th of February despatch (publishing it in London before it reached Pretoria), strongly and ably reviewing the position, but spoiling all by a proposal which, whilst it had not been suggested to or discussed by the Rand people, and would not have been acceptable to them in lieu of what they had demanded, was also an interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal.  It gave the Pretoria Government an opportunity, which they did not miss, of severely snubbing Mr. Chamberlain.  When the latter in turn peremptorily refused their demands, he was informed that the cancellation of the London Convention would not be pressed ‘at present,’ but might remain in abeyance.