to force his way into Johannesburg.  There is not the slightest indication in the newspapers of the time, which without doubt reflected every varying mood and repeated every rumour which it was possible to catch from an excited people, that there was in any man’s mind a suspicion that the Boers would be able to stop the invader.  In the first place no one believed that they could mobilize sufficiently quickly to oppose him, and in the second place, he was understood to have a force of 800 men so admirably equipped and trained that it would not be possible for 5,000 Boers hurriedly called together to intercept him.  All this, however, was forgotten when it came to accounting for the disaster; or rather, the previous convictions only added strength to the rage of disappointment.  The public by that time knew of the letter of invitation; it had been taken on the battle-field and news of it was telegraphed in, and apart from this the writers had made no secret of it.  But what the public did not know, and what, if they had known it, would not have appealed with similar force, was the efforts made to stop Jameson and the practical withdrawal of the letter before he had started.  It was sufficient for them during the few remaining hours of that day to recall that Jameson had come in, that he had fought against great odds, and that when almost reaching his goal he had been taken prisoner for want of assistance.  It is perfectly true that in their rage of grief and disappointment men were willing to march out with pick-handles to rescue him, if there were not rifles enough to arm them.  While the excitement lasted this was the mood, and the Reform Committee were the scapegoats.  The attitude of the crowd was due to ignorance of the circumstances and natural emotion which could not be otherwise vented.  The excitement had greatly abated by the following morning, and it was realized then that the position was practically but little worse than that which the Reform Committee had offered to take up when they tendered their persons as security for the evacuation of the country by the invading force, and had proposed to continue the struggle without their aid.

The reports received by the Johannesburg people were to the effect that the surrender had been conditional upon the sparing of the lives of the force.  Indeed the first reports agreed that Jameson upon receipt of the High Commissioner’s proclamation, had laid down his arms; but upon the return of Mr. Lace (whose mission has been explained) it was realized that this was not the case.  A later account showed that Jameson had surrendered to Commandant Cronje on the condition that the lives of all should be spared, and this version of the surrender was published in the Johannesburg newspapers.  When further accounts were received from Pretoria and Krugersdorp, stating that the surrender had been unconditional and that there was grave doubt as to what would be done with Dr. Jameson, it was surmised as an explanation that he had declined to bargain for his own life and had merely stipulated that those of his followers should be spared.