Yesterday morning Mr. Burgers came to me to arrange how the matter should be done.  I read to him the draft of my Proclamation, and he proposed the alteration of two words only, to which I agreed.  He brought to me a number of conditions which he wished me to insert, which I have accepted, and have embodied in my Proclamation.  He told me that he could not help issuing a protest, to keep the noisy portion of the people quiet—­and you will see grounds for this precaution when I tell you that there are only half a dozen native constables to represent the power of the State in Pretoria, and a considerable number of the Boers in the neighbourhood are of the lowest and most ignorant class.  Mr. Burgers read me, too, the draft of his protest, and asked me if I saw any objection to it, or thought it too strong.  I said that it appeared to me to pledge the people to resist by-and-by; to which he replied that it was to tide over the difficulty of the moment, seeing that my support, the troops, were a fortnight’s march distant, and that by the time the answer to the protest came, all desire of opposition would have died out.  I therefore did not persuade him from his protest.

You will see, when the proclamation reaches you, that I have taken high ground.  Nothing but annexation will or can save the State, and nothing else can save South Africa from the direst consequences.  All the thinking and intelligent people know this, and will be thankful to be delivered from the thraldom of petty factions, by which they are perpetually kept in a state of excitement and unrest, because the Government, and everything connected with it, is a thorough sham.

This arrangement with President Burgers was a most improper compromise on both sides.  Moreover, Shepstone received the protests of the Executive Council and of the Volksraad before he issued his proclamation.  He had plenty of evidence to show that even if his action was approved by the majority, the Boers were sufficiently divided to demand some delay.  He knew that the members of the Government and of the Raad would not face the responsibility of relinquishing the State’s independence, although he received private assurances and entreaties encouraging him to act.  He had representations and deputations from the Boers themselves, sufficient in weight and number to warrant his belief that a large proportion of the people desired annexation.  He should not have allowed the ‘hedging’ that was practised at his expense.  The Boer leaders were ‘between the devil and the deep sea.’  There can be no doubt whatever that they dearly loved and prized their independence, and would have fought even then for it had they been in a position to preserve and profit by it; but they were not.  They dared neither ask for relief at the price of annexation, nor reject the proffered relief at the price of continuing the hopeless struggle.  So they compromised.  They took the relief, they accepted pay of the new Government, and entered a protest, so as to put themselves right with the records and stand well with untamed ones of the party.