The general public did not know the circumstances under which Dr. Jameson had agreed to remain on the frontier.  They did not know that telegrams and messengers had been despatched to stop him, nor was it felt advisable to inform them of these steps at a time when matters had seemingly gone too far to be stopped.  It was considered that any statement of that kind put forth at that particular juncture would simply tend to create a panic from which no good results could accrue, and that, as Dr Jameson had cast the die and crossed his Rubicon, as little as possible should be done needlessly to embarrass him.  Suggestions were continually being made, and have been and are still being frequently quoted, to the effect that a force should be sent out to create a diversion among the Boer commandoes in Jameson’s favour.  Suggestions were made by men who had not the remotest idea of the resources at the command of the Committee, or who did not stop to think of what might have happened had Johannesburg been depleted of its armed force, and so left at the mercy of a few hundred Boers.  There were always, as there will always be, men prepared for any reckless gamble, but this course was most earnestly considered time after time by the Committee when some fresh suggestion or development seemed to warrant a reconsideration of the decision already arrived at not to attempt any aggressive measures.  Finally the matter was by common consent left in the hands of Colonel Heyman, an officer who has rendered distinguished service in South Africa, and whose reputation and judgment were acknowledged by all.  This course was the more readily agreed to since Colonel Heyman was by none more highly thought of than by Dr. Jameson himself.  The decision given by him was that the invading force, properly led, drilled and equipped as it was, was a far stronger body than the entire force enrolled under the Reform Committee, and that it would require a very large force indeed of burghers to stop it.  If Dr. Jameson had thought that he would need help there had been ample time for him to send a fast mounted messenger to Johannesburg.  He had not done so; and it was therefore to be presumed that as he had taken upon himself the responsibility of invasion he was prepared for all contingencies; but, apart from this, the force available in Johannesburg, which would be in a few days a very good one behind earthworks, was at that moment utterly unfit to march out in the open.  It would in its then condition, and with no equipment of field-pieces, be liable to be annihilated by a relatively small number of Boers before it should reach Dr. Jameson.  It was decided, however, that, should fighting take place within such distance from the town that men could be taken from the defences without endangering the safety of the town, a force should be taken out at once.

Fault has repeatedly been found with the military organization in Johannesburg for not having been well served by an Intelligence Department, and for not knowing from day to day what the whereabouts and position of Dr. Jameson’s forces were.