particular Sunday, while we were getting all the rest that a shell-worried garrison can reasonably expect, some of our enemies were labouring hard to mount a big gun on Surprise Hill, which rises from a series of stone-roughened kopjes where the Harrismith Railway winds nearly due west of Rietfontein or Pepworth’s Hill, and about 4000 yards north of King’s Post—­one of our most important defensive works.  In anticipation of this we had shifted one heavy naval gun to Cove Redoubt, which is well within that weapon’s range of Surprise Hill, but can hardly be said to command it, as the latter has an advantage in point of height.  We had also, however, lighter artillery bearing on Surprise Hill, and in some measure enfilading its main battery, behind which, and in echelon with it, they had apparently placed a howitzer.

Cannonading opened from many quarters soon after daybreak, the enemy’s fire being mainly directed against our naval guns, one of which, however, devoted itself exclusively for a time to the Surprise Hill battery where the Boers were preparing for action.

Before they could get many shots out of the new gun, we were pounding away at it.  Our first two shells fell short, but they were followed by three others, clean into the battery’s embrasure, with such obvious effect that the big weapon inside must either have been dismantled or put out of action.  Since then it has not spoken, and the sailors therefore naturally claim that they have silenced it for good and all.  An hour later the other naval gun—­“Lady Anne” by name—­silenced “Puffing Billy of Bulwaan” for a time, and we have evidence that the Boers must have suffered some serious losses before noon, when General Joubert sent in a flag of truce, according to a custom which seems to be in favour with him, whenever things are going a bit awry from his point of view.

The Irish-American, who has been mentioned as having given himself up as a deserter, described how the Boer gunners, terrorised by shrapnel fire, had to be forced into the batteries under threats.  But if the Boer gunners are panic-stricken they have a curious way of showing it, for some of them stood boldly on the parapets to watch the effect of a shot, and the accuracy of their return fire does not betray much nervousness.  We are inclined to believe, however, that the Boer losses from artillery fire have been greater than ours, partly because their shots have been widely distributed in a speculative way with no particular object in view, while ours have been aimed directly at the enemy’s batteries, or at sangars, to which their gun-crews retire between the rounds; and partly, if not mainly, because our naval guns fire common shell with bursting charges of black powder, the effect of which—­though not so violent locally as that of the Boer shells, charged with melinite explosive—­is spread over a much wider area.  It is not much satisfaction, however, for the losses and worry we endure here to know that the investing force suffers even more severely so long as it continues to harass us while we remain inactively helpless.