means been exaggerated.  General De Wet, on being asked how long he thought the war would last if the numbers could be inverted, remarked:  “As long as it would take to cable defeat to England.”  We do not wonder that some of the burghers eventually became discouraged and surrendered to the foe, especially when we think how great the odds were against which they had to contend month after month.  We are rather surprised that so many did not become disheartened, but unflinchingly maintained the struggle until their Governments and leaders advised a general surrender.

Not only had we to confront such overpowering numbers, but these forces were under the control of England’s most distinguished generals, men who combined practical experience with the advantage of a military training.  These generals for the most part had achieved glory and renown in many a campaign—­in Afghanistan, Egypt, and elsewhere—­and thus came to South Africa, not to get their first lessons in warfare, but as experienced leaders of a great army.  With such men to lead the British forces on to battle, if not to victory, three months were considered all too long by many to crush and wipe out of existence two small republics.

Opposed to these (famous) British officers stood the inexperienced Boer leaders.  What a contrast!  The Boer officers, with very few exceptions, were men without a shadow of military training, some even poorly developed mentally.  They were, with few exceptions, peasants pure and simple, who left their ploughfields and flocks to take upon themselves the command over no less inexperienced burghers.  These Boer leaders, elected by the people in times of peace, went to the front without the least practical knowledge of warfare.  True, a few of them, such as Cronje, De la Rey, and Prinsloo had been leaders in Kaffir wars, and in such the burghers placed implicit confidence.  Needless almost to state that in most of these so-called Kaffir warriors the Boers were utterly disappointed.  It was one thing to attack natives badly armed, it was another thing to face an organised army well equipped with death-dealing instruments.  We were thus at a great disadvantage at the commencement of hostilities as far as leaders were concerned.  Gradually our staff of officers was improved, for the best men came to the front, and some of the older officers, who were unfit, were replaced by younger and abler ones.  All these changes, however, took a long time, and were not effected before we had been subjected to two great disasters:  one that of Cronje’s capture on the 27th of February, 1900, the other, Prinsloo’s surrender on the 1st of August, 1900, disasters which proved decisive epochs in the Anglo-Boer war.