Not only was our intercourse with the outer world sadly impeded, but our internal communication was likewise seriously disturbed.  The British, having divided the two states into several small sections by their blockhouse system, made it extremely difficult for the different commandoes to come in touch with one another.  Our despatch riders, who had to beat their way through the various blockhouse lines, were sometimes so hemmed in by these that escape was impossible, and thus their despatches fell into the hands of the enemy.  Towards the latter part of the war we were entirely dependent upon despatch riders for the transmission of our reports or messages.  We had no more the inestimable advantage of heliographic instruments or telegraph wires, which were at the disposal of the British.  Our reinforcements often arrived too late at the scene of action because the reports were delayed on the way, and so a battle was lost where a victory might have been secured.

The number of able-bodied men that the Republics could put in the field against the British forces was extremely limited.  They had to contend against great numbers, and these numbers were reinforced from time to time.  While the Boer numbers decreased, those of the enemy increased.  It was certainly an heroic action on the part of two small republics to enter upon a contest with the British Empire, not to say with England, but was it not more heroic for these untrained farmers to confront and defy the overwhelming numbers brought against them?  Surely this, if nothing else, should entitle the Boer to a place in the history of nations.  Is this not proof sufficient that, when their Governments with their consent despatched an ultimatum, it was not arrogance which prompted them to take up arms against the British, but steadfast determination to vindicate their sacred rights at any price?

As to the numbers that were employed during the war, the official statement of the War Department makes the number of officers and soldiers that were engaged in active service in South Africa about 500,000.  To this must be added the number of armed natives, which would increase the sum total considerably.  The Boer estimates vary, yet we do not hesitate to state that not more, but rather less, than 50,000 Boers were ever in the field.  Of these a large proportion usually remained in the laagers, and never fired a shot at the enemy.  After Prinsloo’s surrender there were hardly 8,000 men still in the field.  According to these numbers, the odds were ten to one.  According to other authorities, the odds were even greater.  One English writer says:  “What glory shall a mighty empire win from a victory over 15,000 farmers?  We are forcing upon our army the cruel humiliation of beating our enemy by sheer force of fifteen against one; we who used to boast that one Briton was a match for any three of his foes.”  The official returns at the close of the war substantiates the above figures, and show that it has not by any