That the war presented many difficulties to our opponents cannot be denied.  They were unexpectedly brought to a crisis, and were but half prepared to meet it.  Their reinforcements were delayed in being transported thousands of miles.  Their own subjects rose in rebellion and assisted the Boers.  They were at first unacquainted with the country in which they had to fight.

How the enemy confronted and overcame these difficulties, and how their disadvantages gradually vanished like smoke, is well known.  Troops, more troops, and still more were despatched to South Africa, until finally the Republics were literally flooded by the gentlemen in khaki.  By the end of February, 1900, Lord Roberts had at his disposal tens of thousands, by whom General Cronje was surrounded and captured, and who paved the Field-Marshal’s way for him to Bloemfontein and Pretoria.  The difficulty and disadvantage arising from their not knowing the geographical features of the country in which they had to operate was gradually solved and cleared.  Cape colonials enlisted in the British ranks, and these acted as guides and scouts.  They knew the features of the country as well as the Boers, and could thus render very efficient service to the British.  Still later, services of inestimable value were rendered to the British forces by natives, and, alas! even republicans themselves, who joined the enemy’s ranks.  When these enlisted, the English were provided with the best of guides, scouts and spies.

The disadvantages of the enemy were, to a large extent, the advantages of the, Boers.  They had a very accurate knowledge of the country where they were fighting.  The value of such a knowledge can hardly be over-estimated.  If they had not known the country as well as they did, the English forces would certainly have been more successful in effecting their capture; and they would have often been in a sad plight.  Our knowledge of the field of operations proved our salvation on more than one occasion, and was at the bottom of some successes achieved over the enemy.  To know every mountain, hill, river, brooklet, valley, or donga is to be forearmed.  The general that knows the battlefield is infinitely better off than the one that does not.  He knows precisely how and when to lead an attack, or what to do when unexpectedly attacked.  Now the Boer commanders had this intimate knowledge of the country, a knowledge which served them in good stead, and accounts for the Boers’ marvellous mobility.  They were not tied to roads, but could move in any direction, by night as well as by day, without ever losing their track.  This the enemy could not do, not even with the aid of scientific instruments.  When the natives and some of the burghers attached themselves to the British forces, then, and then only, were they able to make forced marches by night, and surprise the Boers when least expected.