a crime cannot be held responsible for that crime.  It would, sir, be intolerable if a leader of a column should be held responsible for every act committed by the men under his command.  We are glad to know, sir, that in the history of this war British troops have behaved in an exemplary manner, but there have been occasions when they have done things not in accordance with the laws and usages of war, and it would be unfair to hold a general responsible for such acts of isolated individuals.  On the question of intent and what constitutes responsibility for a crime, I would refer to Manual of Military Law, pages 112 and 113, paragraph 17:—­’If the offence charged involves some special intent, it must be shown that the assistant was cognizant of the intention of the person whom he assisted; thus, on a charge of wounding with intent to murder, it must be shown that the assistant not only assisted the principal offender in what he did, but also knew what his intention was, before the former can be convicted on the full charge.’  Then again, paragraph 18.  After referring to persons going out with common intent it says that a person is not responsible for any offence ’committed by any member of the party, which is unconnected with a common purpose, unless he personally instigates or assists in its commission.’  And to give an example, sir, of common intent, the purpose for which a commander and his men go on commando is to kill and destroy the enemy, not that of killing prisoners and non-combatants, or prisoners without a trial, and if a subordinate without orders from his superior commits a crime, that superior cannot be held responsible for it unless he has consented to it or knew of it.  I would also refer to paragraph 20:—­’Mere knowledge that a person is about to commit an offence, and even conduct influenced by such knowledge, will not make a person responsible for that offence, unless he does something actively to encourage its commission.’  And last of all I would refer to Army Act, section 6, page 322:—­’Every person subject to Military Law who commits any of the following offences, that is to say (f):—­Does violence to any person bringing provisions or supplies to the forces, or commits any offence against the property of persons or any inhabitant or resident in the country in which he is serving,’ but says nothing about the responsibility of a superior officer.

“We may take it therefore that Kritzinger can only be responsible for a murder when he has given either general or special orders, or when he knew of it beforehand, and consented to its being done.  Now, sir, what proof have we of that being so in this case?

“Let us take the first charge—­the charge of shooting two natives at Grootplaats.  There can be no doubt that these natives were spies.  They came into the Boer lines unarmed, ununiformed, and with false passes.  They carried two passes, one representing them as belonging to