The Boer forces on the east of the Modder River had in the meanwhile been doing their best to come to the assistance of General De Wet.  But their progress was much retarded by the uneven veldt and dongas through which they had to ride.  After three hours, spent in fruitless attempts, they forded the river, attacked the enemy with great energy, and succeeded in putting them to flight, and this brought the battle to an end.

We made 480 captives.  What their losses in wounded and killed were is difficult to estimate.  In the evening, when all was over, we went to the house where the wounded were gathered, and there counted in one room alone 96 cases.  Their own report made their losses 350 dead and wounded.  Besides, 7 guns and 117 waggons fell into our hands.  Our loss consisted in 3 killed and 5 wounded.

On looking at the bodies of the dead and listening to the groanings of the wounded, one was forced to say what a pity that the trap was discovered, that one brave man, through his very bravery, prevented the bloodless capture of his column and his general.

MOSTERT’S HOEK.

The victory at Sanna’s Post was soon followed up by another success over the British arms.  On the evening of the eventful day at the Waterworks De Wet handed the command over to Generals A. Cronje and Piet De Wet, and, having taken three of his staff, he went in the direction of Dewetsdorp on a reconnoitring expedition.

The following day he learnt that a party of the enemy had occupied Dewetsdorp.  On receiving the report his mind was made up:  these too must be captured.  He was then thirty miles away from the commandoes, but instantly despatched a report to us to come post-haste so as to attack the enemy at Dewetsdorp or intercept them, should they try to join the main body, which was advancing under Gatacre on Reddersburg.

In the meanwhile the burghers of that district, who had gone to their farms on the fall of Bloemfontein, were commandeered.  With these, some 120, who were almost all unarmed, De Wet started for Dewetsdorp to watch the movements of the British.

Early on the 2nd of April the enemy left Dewetsdorp, and resumed their march to Reddersburg.  While marching De Wet kept them all the while under surveillance.  He was moving on one of their flanks, parallel to them with an intervening distance of six miles.  They were evidently not aware that he was so close to them.  As soon as we received the report concerning the British, we left Sanna’s Post in haste.  We required no urging on.  For were we not encouraged by our recent success, and was there not every chance of achieving another?  We left Sanna’s Post a little before sunset, and that whole night we rode on without off-saddling once.  We did not halt save for a few minutes to rest our horses.

Early the following morning a third report, pressing us to increase our speed and leave behind those whose horses were too tired to proceed rapidly, reached us.  De Wet was most anxious to occupy a ridge in front of the enemy, between the farms Mostert’s Hoek and Sterkfontein.  The road leading to Reddersburg from Dewetsdorp traverses this ridge.  Hence it was absolutely necessary to seize it before the enemy if we were to intercept them.