forces consumed seven hours in making the ten miles’ journey from Thaba N’Chu to the same place.  The British column was unable to move more rapidly on account of its large convoy of waggons, but even then the rate of progress was not as great as that made by the trekking party of the three generals who were similarly hampered.  It was rarely the case that the Boers attempted to trek for any considerable distance with their heavy waggons when they were aware of the presence of the enemy in the vicinity.  Ox-waggons were always left behind, while only a small number of mule-waggons, bearing provisions and ammunition, were taken, and on that account they were able to move with greater rapidity than their opponents.  Frequently they entered dangerous territory with only a few days’ provisions and risked a famine of food and ammunition rather than load themselves down with many lumbering waggons which were likely to retard their progress.  After fighting the battle at Moester’s Hoek, General De Wet had hardly three days’ food and very little ammunition with him, yet rather than delay his march and send for more waggons, he proceeded to Wepener where, after several days’ fighting, both his food and ammunition became exhausted and he was obliged to lie idle around the enemy and await the arrival of the supplies which he might have carried with him at the outset of the trek if he had cared to risk such an impediment to his rapid movements.

One of the primary reasons why the Boer could move more rapidly than the British was the difference in the weight carried by their horses.  The Boer paid no attention to art when he went to war, and consequently he carried nothing that was not absolutely essential.  His saddle was less than half the weight of a British saddle, and that was almost all the equipment he carried when on a trek.  The Boer rider and equipment, including saddle, rifle, blankets, and a food-supply, rarely weighed more than two hundred and fifty pounds, which was not a heavy load for a horse to carry.  A British cavalryman and his equipment of heavy saddle, sabre, carbine, and saddle-bags, rarely weighed less than four hundred pounds—­a burden which soon tired a horse.  Again, almost every Boer had two horses, so that when one had been ridden for an hour or more he was relieved and led, while the other was used.  In this manner the Boers were able to travel from twelve to fourteen hours in a day when it was absolutely necessary to reach a certain point at a given time.  Six miles an hour was the rate of progress ascribed to horses in normal condition, and when a forced march was attempted they could travel sixty and seventy miles in a day, and be in good condition the following morning to undertake another journey of equal length.  Small commandos often covered sixty and seventy miles in a day, especially during the fighting along the Tugela, while after the battles of Poplar Grove and Abraham’s Kraal, and the capture of Bloemfontein, it seemed as if the entire army in the Free State were moving northward at a rate of speed far exceeding that of an express train.  The mobility of the Boer army was then on a par with that of the British army after the battle of Dundee, and it was difficult to determine which of the two deserved the palm for the best display of accelerated motion.