Government of India, whereas the powers of the Secretary of State, who has succeeded to the powers of the old Board of Control of the East India Company, are discretionary powers.  The statute from which the Secretary of State actually derives his powers is the Government of India Act, 1858, which under section 3 declares that the Secretary of State “shall have and perform all such or the like powers and duties in any wise relating to the government or revenues of India and all such or the like powers over all officers appointed or continued under this Act as might or should have been exercised or performed” by the Company and Board of Control, and those powers and duties are defined in the following terms in the Act of 1833 (3 and 4 William IV., c. 85, sec. 25), which Mr. Montagu would seem to have had in his mind, though he quoted it imperfectly:  “The said Board [of Control] shall have and be invested with full power and authority to superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns, &c.”  The difference, as has been very properly pointed out in the Manchester Guardian, no unfriendly critic of the present Administration, is “between exercising control and the power to exercise control, between ‘shall’ and ‘may.’  If these words of the Act were to be abbreviated, the right abbreviation would have been ‘may.’  This is the word used by Sir Courtenay Ilbert in his summary of the Secretary of State’s powers (The Government of India, p. 145);—­’... the Secretary of State may, subject to the provisions embodied in this digest, superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns, &c.’  This difference between ‘shall’ and ‘may’ is, of course, vital.  ‘Shall’ implies that the Secretary of State is standing over the Viceroy in everything he does; ‘may’ simply reserves to him the right of control where he disapproves.  ‘Shall’ imparts an agency of an inferior order; ‘may’ safeguards the rights of the Crown and Parliament without impairing the dignity of the Viceregal office.”

Of greater importance, however, is the construction which Mr. Montagu places on these statutes.  There are three fundamental objections to the doctrine of “agency” which he propounds in regard to the functions of the Viceroy.  In the first place, it ignores one of the most important features of his office—­one, indeed, to which supreme importance attaches in a country such as India, where the sentiment of reverence for the Sovereign is rooted in the most ancient traditions of all races and creeds.  The Viceroy is the direct and personal representative of the King-Emperor, and in that capacity, at any rate, it would certainly be improper to describe him as the “agent” of the Secretary of State.  From this point of view, any attempt to lower his office would tend dangerously to weaken the prestige of the Crown, which, to put it on the lowest grounds, is one of the greatest assets of the British Raj.  In the second place, Mr. Montagu ignores equally another distinctive feature of the Viceroy’s office, especially important in regard to his relations with the Secretary of State—­namely, that, in his executive as well as in his legislative capacity, the Viceroy is not a mere individual, but the Governor-General in Council.  Mr. Montagu omitted to quote the important section of the Act of 1833, confirmed in subsequent enactments, which declared that:—­