In criticism of it we may say that he who accepts it has wandered away from a rather widely recognized scientific hypothesis, and has substituted for it a very doubtful speculation for which there seems to be no whit of evidence.  It is, moreover, a speculation repugnant to the scientific mind, when its significance is grasped.  Shall we assume without evidence that, when a man wakes in the morning and enjoys a mental life suspended or diminished during the night, his thoughts and feelings have come into being at the expense of his body?  Shall we assume that the mass of his body has been slightly diminished, or that motions have disappeared in a way that cannot be accounted for by a reference to the laws of matter in motion?  This seems an extraordinary assumption, and one little in harmony with the doctrine of the eternity of mass and the conservation of energy as commonly understood.  We need not take it seriously so long as it is quite unsupported by evidence.

46.  THE ORDER OF NATURE AND “FREE-WILL.”—­In a world as orderly as, in the previous section, this world is conceived to be, is there any room for freedom?  What if the man of science is right in suspecting that the series of physical causes and effects is nowhere broken?  Must we then conclude that we are never free?

To many persons it has seemed that we are forced to draw this conclusion, and it is not surprising that they view the doctrine with dismay.  They argue:  Mental phenomena are made parallel with physical, and the order of physical phenomena seems to be determined throughout, for nothing can happen in the world of matter unless there is some adequate cause of its happening.  If, then, I choose to raise my finger, that movement must be admitted to have physical causes, and those causes other causes, and so on without end.  If such a movement must always have its place in a causal series of this kind, how can it be regarded as a free movement?  It is determined, and not free.

Now, it is far from a pleasant thing to watch the man of science busily at work trying to prove that the physical world is an orderly system, and all the while to feel in one’s heart that the success of his efforts condemns one to slavery.  It can hardly fail to make one’s attitude towards science that of alarm and antagonism.  From this I shall try to free the reader by showing that our freedom is not in the least danger, and that we may look on unconcerned.

When we approach that venerable dispute touching the freedom of the will, which has inspired men to such endless discussions, and upon which they have written with such warmth and even acrimony, the very first thing to do is to discover what we have a right to mean when we call a man free.  As long as the meaning of the word is in doubt, the very subject of the dispute is in doubt.  When may we, then, properly call a man free?  What is the normal application of the term?