(3) Finally, to bring the mental phenomena we are familiar with, sensations of color, sound, touch, taste, etc., into this evolutionary scheme, he is forced to assume that all such mental phenomena are made up of elements which do not belong to these classes at all, of something that “cannot even be felt.”  For this assumption there is as little evidence as there is for the other two.

The fact is that the mind-stuff doctrine is a castle in the air.  It is too fanciful and arbitrary to take seriously.  It is much better to come back to a more sober view of things, and to hold that there is evidence that other minds exist, but no evidence that every material thing is animated.  If we cannot fit this into our evolutionary scheme, perhaps it is well to reexamine our evolutionary scheme, and to see whether some misconception may not attach to that.

[1] “Collected Essays,” Vol.  I, p. 219, New York, 1902.

[2] “On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves,” in “Lectures and Essays,” Vol.  II.

[3] “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy,” Chapter XII.

[4] “On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves.”

CHAPTER XI

OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND

44.  IS THE MATERIAL WORLD A MECHANISM?—­So far we have concerned ourselves with certain leading problems touching the external world and the mind,—­problems which seem to present themselves unavoidably to those who enter upon the path of reflection.  And we have seen, I hope, that there is much truth, as well as some misconception, contained in the rather vague opinions of the plain man.

But the problems that we have taken up by no means exhaust the series of those that present themselves to one who thinks with patience and persistency.  When we have decided that men are not mistaken in believing that an external world is presented in their experience; when we have corrected our first crude notions of what this world is, and have cleared away some confusions from our conceptions of space and time; when we have attained to a reasonably clear view of the nature of the mind, and of the nature of its connection with the body; when we have escaped from a tumble into the absurd doctrine that no mind exists save our own, and have turned our backs upon the rash speculations of the adherents of “mind-stuff”; there still remain many points upon which we should like to have definite information.

In the present chapter I shall take up and turn over a few of these, but it must not be supposed that one can get more than a glimpse of them within such narrow limits.  First of all we will raise the question whether it is permissible to regard the material world, which we accept, as through and through a mechanism.