There is, then, a sense in which we may affirm that time is infinitely divisible.  But we must remember that apparent time—­the time presented in any single experience of duration—­is never infinitely divisible; and that real time, in any save a relative sense of the word, is not a single experience of duration at all.  It is a recognition of the fact that experiences of duration may be substituted for each other without assignable limit.

(4) But what shall we say to the last problem—­to the question how we can be conscious of time at all, when the parts of time are all successive?  How can we even have a consciousness of “crude” time, of apparent time, of duration in any sense of the word, when duration must be made up of moments no two of which can exist together and no one of which alone can constitute time?  The past is not now, the future is not yet, the present is a mere point, as we are told, and cannot have parts.  If we are conscious of time as past, present, and future, must we not be conscious of a series as a series when every member of it save one is nonexistent?  Can a man be conscious of the nonexistent?

The difficulty does seem a serious one, and yet I venture to affirm that, if we examine it carefully, we shall see that it is a difficulty of our own devising.  The argument quietly makes an assumption—­and makes it gratuitously—­with which any consciousness of duration is incompatible, and then asks us how there can be such a thing as a consciousness of duration.

The assumption is that we can be conscious only of the existent, and this, written out a little more at length, reads as follows:  we can be conscious only of the now existent, or, in other words of the present.  Of course, this determines from the outset that we cannot be conscious of the past and the future, of duration.

The past and the future are, to be sure, nonexistent from the point of view of the present; but it should be remarked as well that the present is nonexistent from the point of view of the past or the future.  If we are talking of time at all we are talking of that no two parts of which are simultaneous; it would be absurd to speak of a past that existed simultaneously with the present, just as it would be absurd to speak of a present existing simultaneously with the past.  But we should not deny to past, present, and future, respectively, their appropriate existence; nor is it by any means self-evident that there cannot be a consciousness of past, present, and future as such.

We fall in with the assumption, it seems, because we know very well that we are not directly conscious of a remote past and a remote future.  We represent these to ourselves by means of some proxy—­we have present memories of times long past and present anticipations of what will be in the time to come.  Moreover, we use the word “present” very loosely; we say the present year, the present day, the present hour, the present minute, or the present second.  When we use the word thus loosely, there seems no reason for believing that there should be such a thing as a direct consciousness that extends beyond the present.  It appears reasonable to say:  No one can be conscious save of the present.