Mach:  14. 
  Mackenzie:  315. 
  Malebranche:  referred to, 142. 
  Martineau:  315. 
  Materialism:  primitive man’s notion of mind, 100-101;
    materialism in the Greek philosophy, 101-102;
    refutation of, 111-132;
    general account of, 194-197. 
  Mathematics:  nature of mathematical knowledge, 23-25;
    arithmetic compared with logic, 225-226;
    mathematical relations and cause and effect, 257;
    mathematical methods, 256-257. 
  Matter:  what is meant by material things, 51-58;
    the material world a mechanism, 147-150. 
  “Matter” and “Form”:  see “Form” and “Matter.” 
  McCosh:  on mind and body, 120. 
  Mechanism:  the material world a, 147-150;
    objections to the doctrine, 148-150;
    mind and mechanism, 151-154;
    mechanism and morals, 159-164;
    mechanism and teleology, reference, 310. 
  Metaphysician:  on the mind, 111 ff. 
  Metaphysics:  psychology and, 230-234;
    distinguished from philosophy, 244-245;
    uncertainty of, 247;
    utility of, 269-272;
    traditional divisions of, 315. 
  Method:  scientific method, 256-259. 
  Middle Ages:  view of philosophy in, 8-9. 
  Mill, J. S.:  the argument for other minds, 136-138;
    on permanent possibilities of sensation, 289;
    his logic, 314. 
  Mind:  the child’s notion of, 100;
    regarded as breath, 101;
    suggestions of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew words for mind or
      soul, 101;
    materialistic views of, in Greek philosophy, 101-102;
    Plato and Aristotle on nature of, 102-103;
    doctrine of Plotinus, 103;
    of Cassiodorus, 103;
    of Augustine, 104;
    of Descartes, 105-106;
    modern common sense notions of mind, 106-110;
    mind as substance, Locke quoted, 108-109;
    psychologist’s notion of, 110-111;
    what the mind is, 111-114;
    place of mind in nature, 151-154;
    minds active, 162-163;
    see also, Mind and Body, and Other Minds. 
  Mind and Body:  is the mind in the body, 115-117;
    plain man’s notion of, 116;
    interactionism, 117-121;
    doctrine of Descartes and his successors, 119-120;
    plain man as interactionist, 120;
    McCosh quoted, 120-121;
    objection to interactionism, 121;
    parallelism, 121-126;
    its foundation in experience, 123-124;
    meaning of word “concomitance,” 123-125;
    time and place of mental phenomena, 126-129;
    objections to parallelism, 129-132;
    Clifford’s parallelism criticised, 130;
    mental phenomena and causality, 129;
    double sense of word “concomitance,” 131-132;
    mind and the mechanism of the world, 151-154;
    mechanism and morals, 159-164;
    “concomitant phenomena” and attainment of ends, 162;
    references given on other minds and mind-stuff, 309;
    see also, Other Minds.