Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller’s doctrine is that truths are man-made, and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them.  It is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I shall not dwell upon it.  Dr. Schiller’s essays are very entertainingly written.

Professor Dewey’s pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from the above to merit another title.  In the “Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,” Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey brings out the distinction between his own position and that of Professor James.

To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail.  Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the “Philosophical Review,” Volume XVII, No. 1.  See, on the other side, Professor Perry, in the “Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods,” Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben, “Philosophical Review,” XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, “The Monist,” July, 1908.

CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68.  To see how the logicians have regarded their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes’s “Formal Logic” (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse’s “Theory of Knowledge” (London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins’s “The Principles of Logic” (N.Y., 1902), Introduction; and Creighton’s “Introductory Logic” (N.Y., 1898), Preface.

Professor Aikins writes:  “Thus, in so far as logic tries to make us reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way in which their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple metaphysics studied for a practical end.”

Professor Creighton says, “Although in treating the syllogistic logic I have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation, I have both here, and when dealing with the inductive methods, endeavored to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way, and to prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book.”

John Stuart Mill tried not to be metaphysical; but let the reader examine, say, his third chapter, “Of the Things denoted by Names,” or look over Book VI, in his “System of Logic.”

Professor Sigwart’s great work, “Logik” (Freiburg, 2d edition, Volume I, 1889, Volume II, 1893), may almost be called a philosophy of logic.

CHAPTER XVII, section 69.  Compare with Professor James’s account of the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin:  “The question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a fierce warfare has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by the adjustment of mutual claims. . . .  The terms of the adjustment of which I speak are briefly these:  on the one hand, empirical investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and speculative.  Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into the metempirical.”  “Handbook of Psychology,” Preface, pp. iii and iv.