For, if the study of the problems of metaphysics does nothing else for a given individual, it, at least, enables him to comprehend and criticise intelligently the doctrines which are presented for his acceptance by others.  It is a painful thing to feel quite helpless in the face of plausible reasonings which may threaten to rob us of our most cherished hopes, or may tend to persuade us of the vanity of what we have been accustomed to regard as of highest worth.  If we are quite unskilled in the examination of such doctrines, we may be captured by the loosest of arguments—­witness the influence of Spencer’s argument for the “Unknowable,” in the “First Principles”; and if we are ignorant of the history of speculative thought, we may be carried away by old and exploded notions which pose as modern and impressive only because they have been given a modern dress.

We can, of course, refuse to listen to those who would talk with us.  But this savors of bigotry, and the world will certainly not grow wiser, if men generally cultivate a blind adherence to the opinions in which they happen to be brought up.  A cautious conservatism is one thing, and blind obstinacy is another.  To the educated man (and it is probable that others will have to depend on opinions taken at second hand) a better way of avoiding error is open.

Finally, it will not do to overlook the broadening influence of such studies as we are discussing.  How dogmatically men are in the habit of expressing themselves upon those obscure and difficult problems which deal with matters that lie on the confines of human knowledge!  Such an assumption of knowledge cannot but make us uncomprehending and unsympathetic.

There are many subjects upon which, if we hold an opinion at all, we should hold it tentatively, waiting for more light, and retaining a willingness to be enlightened.  Many a bitter and fruitless quarrel might be avoided, if more persons found it possible to maintain this philosophical attitude of mind.  Philosophy is, after all, reflection, and the reflective man must realize that he is probably as liable to error as are other men.  He is not infallible, nor has the limit of human knowledge been attained in his day and generation.  He who realizes this will not assume that his neighbor is always wrong, and he will come to have that wide, conscientious tolerance, which is not indifference, but which is at the farthest remove from the zeal of mere bigotry.

CHAPTER XXIII

WHY WE SHOULD STUDY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

83.  THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE SUBJECT.—­When one reflects upon the number of lecture courses given every year at our universities and colleges on the history of philosophy, one is struck by the fact that philosophy is not treated as are most other subjects with which the student is brought into contact.

If we study mathematics, or chemistry, or physics, or physiology, or biology, the effort is made to lay before us in a convenient form the latest results which have been attained in those sciences.  Of their history very little is said; and, indeed, as we have seen (section 6), lectures on the history of the inductive sciences are apt to be regarded as philosophical in their character and aims rather than as merely scientific.