sees or what he guesses, is accused of an indifference to the effect which his utterances may have upon the less enlightened who hear him speak; many criticise the lawyer for a devotion to the interests of his client which is at times in doubtful harmony with the interests of justice in the larger sense; in the business world commercial integrity is exalted, and lapses from the ethical code which do not assail this cardinal virtue are not always regarded with equal seriousness.

It is as though men elected to worship at the shrine of a particular saint, and were inclined to overlook the claims of others.  For all this there is, of course, a reason; such things are never to be looked upon as mere accident.  But this does not mean that these more or less conflicting standards are all to be accepted as satisfactory and as ultimate.  It is inevitable that those who study ethics seriously, who really reflect upon ethical problems, should sometimes criticise the judgments of their fellow-men rather unfavorably.

Of such independent criticism many persons have a strong distrust.  I am reminded here of an eminent mathematician who maintained that the study of ethics has a tendency to distort the student’s judgments as to what is right and what is wrong.  He had observed that there is apt to be some divergence of opinion between those who think seriously upon morals and those who do not, and he gave the preference to the unthinking majority.

Now, there is undoubtedly danger that the independent thinker may be betrayed into eccentricities of opinion which are unjustifiable and are even dangerous.  But it seems a strange doctrine that it is, on the whole, safer not to think, but rather to drift on the stream of public opinion.  In other fields we are not inclined to believe that the ignorant man, who has given no especial attention to a subject, is the one likely to be right.  Why should it be so in morals?

That the youth who goes to college to seek a liberal education has a need of ethical studies becomes very plain when we come to a realization of the curious limitations of his ethical training as picked up from his previous experience of the world.  He has some very definite notions as to right and wrong.  He is as ready to maintain the desirability of benevolence, justice, and veracity, as was Bishop Butler, who wrote the famous “Analogy “; although, to be sure, he is most inarticulate when called upon to explain what constitutes benevolence, justice, or veracity.  But the strangest thing is, that he seems to place some of the most important decisions of his whole life quite outside the realm of right and wrong.

He may admit that a man should not undertake to be a clergyman, unless he possesses certain qualifications of mind and character which evidently qualify him for that profession.  But he does not see why he has not the right to become a wearisome professor or an incompetent physician, if he chooses to enter upon such a career.  Is a man not free to take up what profession he pleases?  He must take the risk, of course; but if he fails, he fails.