But it is worthy of remark that one may study such a book as this and yet remain pretty consistently on what may be called the plane of the common understanding.  One seems to make the assumptions made in all the special sciences, e.g. the assumption that there is a world of real things and that we can know them and reason about them.  We are not introduced to such problems as:  What is truth? and Is any knowledge valid?  Nor does it seem at once apparent that the man who is studying logic in this way is busying himself with a philosophical discipline.

67.  THE “MODERN LOGIC.”—­It is very puzzling for the student to turn from such a text-book as the one above mentioned to certain others which profess to be occupied with the same science, and which, yet, appear to treat of quite different things.

Thus, in Dr. Bosanquet’s little work on “The Essentials of Logic,” the reader is at once plunged into such questions as the nature of knowledge, and what is meant by the real world.  We seem to be dealing with metaphysics, and not with logic, as we have learned to understand the term.  How is it that the logician comes to regard these things as within his province?

A multitude of writers at the present day are treating logic in this way, and in some great prominence is given to problems which the philosopher recognizes as indisputably his own.  The term “modern logic” is often employed to denote a logic of this type; one which does not, after the fashion of the natural sciences generally, proceed on the basis of certain assumptions, and leave deeper questions to some other discipline, but tries to get to the bottom of things for itself.  The tendency to run into metaphysics is peculiarly marked in those writers who have been influenced by the work of the philosopher Hegel.

I shall not here ask why those who belong to one school are more inclined to be metaphysical than are those who belong to another, but shall approach the broader question why the logicians generally are inclined to be more metaphysical than those who work in certain other special sciences, such as mathematics, for example.  Of the general tendency there can be no question.  The only problem is:  Why does this tendency exist?

68.  LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.—­Let us contrast the science of arithmetic with logic; and let us notice, regarding it, the following points:—­

It is, like logic, a general science, in that the things treated of in many sciences may be numbered.  It considers only a certain aspect of the things.

Now, that things may be counted, added together, subtracted, etc., is guaranteed by the experience of the plain man; and the methods of determining the numerical relations of things are gradually developed before his eyes, beginning with operations of great simplicity.  Moreover, verification is possible, and within certain limits verification by direct inspection.