In 1878 Mr. Charles S. Peirce wrote an article for the Popular Science Monthly in which he proposed as a maxim for the attainment of clearness of apprehension the following:  “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”

This thought has been taken up by others and given a development which Mr. Peirce regards with some suspicion.  He refers[4] especially to the development it has received at the hands of Professor William James, in his two essays, “The Will to Believe” and “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.” [5] Professor James is often regarded as foremost among the pragmatists.

I shall not attempt to define pragmatism, for I do not believe that the doctrine has yet attained to that definiteness of formulation which warrants a definition.  We seem to have to do not so much with a clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been worked out in detail, as with a tendency which makes itself apparent in the works of various writers under somewhat different forms.

I may roughly describe it as the tendency to take that to be true which is useful or serviceable.  It is well illustrated in the two essays to which reference is made above.

Thus, Professor James dwells upon the unsatisfactoriness and uncertainty of philosophical and scientific knowledge:  “Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found?”

Now, among those things regarding which it appears impossible to attain to intellectual certitude, there are matters of great practical moment, and which affect deeply the conduct of life; for example, the doctrines of religion.  Here a merely skeptical attitude seems intolerable.

In such cases, argues Professor James, “we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will.”

It is important to notice that there is no question here of a logical right.  We are concerned with matters regarding which, according to Professor James, we cannot look for intellectual evidence.  It is assumed that we believe simply because we choose to believe—­we believe arbitrarily.

It is further important to notice that what is a “live” hypothesis to one man need not tempt the will of another man at all.  As our author points out, a Turk would naturally will to believe one thing and a Christian would will to believe another.  Each would will to believe what struck him as a satisfactory thing to believe.

What shall we say to this doctrine?  I think we must say that it is clearly not a philosophical method of attaining to truth.  Hence, it has not properly a place in this chapter among the attempts which have been made to attain to the truth of things.