Again.  The term pluralism has been used to indicate the doctrine that individual finite minds are not parts or manifestations of one all-embracing Mind,—­of God or the Absolute,—­but are relatively independent beings.  This doctrine has been urged in our own time, with eloquence and feeling, by Professor Howison.[2] Here we have a pluralism which is idealistic, for it admits in the universe but one kind of thing, minds; and yet refuses to call itself monistic.  It will readily be seen that in this paragraph and in the one preceding the word is used in different senses.

I have added the above sentences to this chapter that the reader may have an explanation of the meaning of a word sometimes met with.  But the title of the chapter is “Monism and Dualism,” and it is of this contrast that it is especially important to grasp the significance.

[1] “Outlines of Psychology,” pp. 64-65, English translation, 1891.

[2] “The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays,” revised edition.  New York, 1905.

CHAPTER XV

RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM

60.  RATIONALISM.—­As the content of a philosophical doctrine must be determined by the initial assumptions which a philosopher makes and by the method which he adopts in his reasonings, it is well to examine with some care certain broad differences in this respect which characterize different philosophers, and which help to explain how it is that the results of their reflections are so startlingly different.

I shall first speak of Rationalism, which I may somewhat loosely define as the doctrine that the reason can attain truths independently of observation—­can go beyond experienced fact and the deductions which experience seems to justify us in making from experienced fact.  The definition cannot mean much to us until it is interpreted by a concrete example, and I shall turn to such.  It must, however, be borne in mind that the word “rationalism” is meant to cover a great variety of opinions, and we have said comparatively little about him when we have called a man a rationalist in philosophy.  Men may agree in believing that the reason can go beyond experienced fact, and yet may differ regarding the particular truths which may be thus attained.

Now, when Descartes found himself discontented with the philosophy that he and others had inherited from the Middle Ages, and undertook a reconstruction, he found it necessary to throw over a vast amount of what had passed as truth, if only with a view to building up again upon a firmer foundation.  It appeared to him that much was uncritically accepted as true in philosophy and in the sciences which a little reflection revealed to be either false or highly doubtful.  Accordingly, he decided to clear the ground by a sweeping doubt, and to begin his task quite independently.