Such considerations as these lead me to object to the expression “objective idealism”:  if the doctrine is really objective, i.e. if it recognizes a system of things different and distinct from what men commonly call ideas, it scarcely seems to have a right to the title idealism; and if it is really idealism, and does not rob the word idea of all significance, it can scarcely be objective in any proper sense of the word.

Manifestly, there is need of a very careful analysis of the meaning of the word “idea,” and of the proper significance of the terms “subjective” and “objective,” if error is to be avoided and language used soberly and accurately.  Those who are not in sympathy with the doctrine of the objective idealists think that in such careful analysis and accurate statement they are rather conspicuously lacking.

We think of Hegel (1770-1831) as the typical objective idealist.  It is not easy to give an accurate account of his doctrine, for he is far from a clear writer, and he has made it possible for his many admirers to understand him in many ways.  But he seems to have accepted the system of things that most men call the real external world, and to have regarded it as the Divine Reason in its self-development.  And most of those whom we would to-day be inclined to gather together under the title of objective idealists appear to have been much influenced, directly or indirectly, by his philosophy.  There are, however, great differences of opinion among them, and no man should be made responsible for the opinions of the class as a class.

I have said a few pages back that some forms of idealism are inspiring, and that some are not.

Bishop Berkeley called the objects of sense ideas.  He regarded all ideas as inactive, and thought that all changes in ideas—­and this includes all the changes that take place in nature—­must be referred to the activity of minds.  Some of those changes he could refer to finite minds, his own and others.  Most of them he could not, and he felt impelled to refer them to a Divine Mind.  Hence, the world became to him a constant revelation of God; and he uses the word “God” in no equivocal sense.  It does not signify to him the system of things as a whole, or an Unknowable, or anything of the sort.  It signifies a spirit akin to his own, but without its limitations.  He writes:[2]—­

“A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when, therefore, we see the color, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves.  Hence, it is plain we do not see a man,—­if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do,—­but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs