Here we have come to the recognition that there are such things as purposes and ends; that an idea and some change in the external world may be related as plan and accomplishment.  In other words, we have been brought face to face with what has been given the somewhat misleading name of final cause.  In so far as that in the bringing about of which I have had a share is my end, I am active; in so far as it is not my end, but comes upon me as something not planned, I am passive.  The enormous importance of the distinction may readily be seen; it is only in so far as I am a creature who can have purposes, that desire and will, foresight and prudence, right and wrong, can have a significance for me.

I have dwelt upon the meaning of the words “activity” and “passivity,” and have been at pains to distinguish them from cause and effect, because the two pairs of terms have often been confounded with each other, and this confusion has given rise to a peculiarly unfortunate error.  It is this error that lies at the foundation of the objection referred to at the beginning of this section.

We have seen that certain men of science are inclined to look upon the physical world as a great system, all the changes in which may be accounted for by an appeal to physical causes.  And we have seen that the parallelist regards ideas, not as links in this chain, but as parallel with physical changes.

It is argued by some that, if this is a true view of things, we must embrace the conclusion that the mind cannot be active at all, that it can accomplish nothing.  We must look upon the mind as an “epiphenomenon,” a useless decoration; and must regard man as “a physical automaton with parallel psychical states.”

Such abuse of one’s fellow-man seems unchristian, and it is wholly uncalled for on any hypothesis.  Our first answer to it is that it seems to be sufficiently refuted by the experiences of common life.  We have abundant evidence that men’s minds do count for something.  I conclude that I want a coat, and I order one of my tailor; he believes that I will pay for it, he wants the money, and he makes the coat; his man desires to earn his wages and he delivers it.  If I had not wanted the coat, if the tailor had not wanted my money, if the man had not wanted to earn his wages, the end would not have been attained.  No philosopher has the right to deny these facts.

Ah! but, it may be answered, these three “wants” are not supposed to be the causes of the motions in matter which result in my appearing well-dressed on Sunday.  They are only concomitant phenomena.