In places the two lines were not one hundred yards apart, and for us no movement was possible during daylight.  In some of the trenches which were under enfilade fire our men had to sit all day long close under the traverses—­as are called those mounds of earth which stretch like partitions at intervals across a trench so as to give protection from lateral fire.  Even where there was cover, such as that afforded by depressions or sunken roads, on the hillside below and behind our firing line, any attempt to cross the intervening space was met by fierce bursts of machine gun and shell fire.

The men in the firing line were on duty for twenty-four hours at a time, and brought rations and water with them when they came on duty, for none could be sent up to them during the day.  Even the wounded could not be removed until dark.

The preliminary retirement of the units was therefore carried out gradually, under cover of darkness.  That the Germans only once opened fire on them while so engaged was due to the care with which the operation was conducted, and also, probably, to the fact that the enemy were so accustomed to the recurrence of the sounds made by the reliefs of the men in the firing line and by the movement of the supply trains below that they were misled as to what was actually taking place.

What the operation amounted to on our part was the evacuation of the trenches, under carefully made arrangements with the French who had to take our place in the trenches; the retirement to the river below—­in many cases down a steep slope; the crossing of the river over the noisy plank roadways of floating or repaired bridges, which were mostly commanded by the enemy’s guns—­and the climb up to the top of the plateau on the south side.

The rest of the move was a complicated feat of transportation which cut across some of the lines of communication of our allies; but it requires no description here.  In spite of the various difficulties, the whole strategic operation of transferring the large number of troops from the Aisne was carried out without loss and practically without a hitch.

As regards the change in the nature of the fighting in which we have recently been engaged, it has already been pointed out that the operations had up till then been of a preparatory nature and that the Germans were obviously seeking to delay us by advanced troops while heavier forces were being got ready and brought up to the scene of action.  It was known that they were raising a new army, consisting of corps formed of Ersatz, (supernumerary reserves), volunteers, and other material which had not yet been drawn upon, and that part of it would in all probability be sent to the western theatre, either to cover the troops laying siege to Antwerp, in case that place should hold out, or, in the event of the capture of the fortress, to act in conjunction with the besieging force in a violent offensive movement toward the coast.