On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily bombarded, and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged.  On the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the First Division was seriously threatened.  A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire Regiment in combination with the Queen’s, and one battalion of the Divisional Reserve was moved up in support.  The Northamptonshire Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy’s trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the trenches and up the hill.  A very strong force of hostile infantry was then disclosed on the crest line.  This new line was enfiladed by part of the Queen’s and the King’s Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on the extreme right of our infantry line, and were supported by a squadron of cavalry on their outer flank.  The enemy’s attack was ultimately driven back with heavy loss.

On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy’s trenches, and captured two Maxim guns.

On the extreme right the Queen’s were heavily attacked, but the enemy was repulsed with great loss.  About midnight the attack was renewed on the First Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again repulsed.

Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the Second Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back.

At about 1 P.M. on the 19th the Second Division drove back a heavy infantry attack strongly supported by artillery fire.  At dusk the attack was renewed and again repulsed.

On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer commanding the Second Army Corps and his divisional commanders the possibility of driving the enemy out of Conde, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the bridge, which has remained throughout in his possession.

As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all points on the south side, and that satisfactory arrangements were made to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would entail, as, in view of the position of the Second and Third Corps, the enemy could make no use of Conde, and would be automatically forced out of it by any advance which might become possible for us.

7.  On this day information reached me from Gen. Joffre that he had found it necessary to make a new plan and to attack and envelop the German right flank.

It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged since the 12th inst. must last some days longer, until the effect of this new flank movement could be felt and a way opened to drive the enemy from his positions.

It thus became essential to establish some system of regular relief in the trenches, and I have used the infantry of the Sixth Division for this purpose with good results.  The relieved brigades were brought back alternately south of the river and, with the artillery of the Sixth Division, formed a general reserve on which I could rely in case of necessity.