“On the territorial question I am inflexible, as you see my position in the book.  On that there is a difference between you and us; and it is the only substantial difference.  You think slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted.  For this neither has any just occasion to be angry with the other.  As to the State laws, mentioned in your sixth question, I really know very little of them.  I never have read one.  If any of them are in conflict with the fugitive-slave clause, or any other part of the Constitution, I certainly shall be glad of their repeal; but I could hardly be justified, as a citizen of Illinois, or as President of the United States, to recommend the repeal of a statute of Vermont or South Carolina.”

Through his intimate correspondence with Mr. Seward and personal friends in Congress, Mr. Lincoln was kept somewhat informed of the hostile temper of the Southern leaders, and that a tremendous pressure was being brought upon that body by timid conservatives and the commercial interests in the North to bring about some kind of compromise which would stay the progress of disunion; and on this point he sent an emphatic monition to Representative Washburne on December 13: 

“Your long letter received.  Prevent as far as possible any of our friends from demoralizing themselves and their cause by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort on slavery extension.  There is no possible compromise upon it but what puts us under again, and all our work to do over again.  Whether it be a Missouri line or Eli Thayer’s popular sovereignty, it is all the same.  Let either be done, and immediately filibustering and extending slavery recommences.  On that point hold firm as a chain of steel.”

Between the day when a President is elected by popular vote and that on which he is officially inaugurated there exists an interim of four long months, during which he has no more direct power in the affairs of government than any private citizen.  However anxiously Mr. Lincoln might watch the development of public events at Washington and in the cotton States; whatever appeals might come to him through interviews or correspondence, no positive action of any kind was within his power, beyond an occasional word of advice or suggestion.  The position of the Republican leaders in Congress was not much better.  Until the actual secession of States, and the departure of their representatives, they were in a minority in the Senate; while the so-called South Americans and Anti-Lecompton Democrats held the balance of power in the House.  The session was mainly consumed in excited, profitless discussion.  Both the Senate and House appointed compromise committees, which met and labored, but could find no common ground of agreement.  A peace convention met and deliberated at Washington, with no practical result, except to waste the powder for a salute of one hundred guns over a sham report to which nobody paid the least attention.