If the result of Mr. Greeley’s Niagara efforts left any doubt that peace was at present unattainable, the fact was demonstrated beyond question by the published report of another unofficial and volunteer negotiation which was proceeding at the same time.  In May, 1863, James F. Jaquess, D.D., a Methodist clergyman of piety and religious enthusiasm, who had been appointed by Governor Yates colonel of an Illinois regiment, applied for permission to go South, urging that by virtue of his church relations he could, within ninety days, obtain acceptable terms of peace from the Confederates.  The military superiors to whom he submitted the request forwarded it to Mr. Lincoln with a favorable indorsement; and the President replied, consenting that they grant him a furlough, if they saw fit, but saying: 

“He cannot go with any government authority whatever.  This is absolute and imperative.”

Eleven days later he was back again within Union lines, claiming to have valuable “unofficial” proposals for peace.  President Lincoln paid no attention to his request for an interview, and in course of time he returned to his regiment.  Nothing daunted, however, a year later he applied for and received permission to repeat his visit, this time in company with J.R.  Gilmore, a lecturer and writer, but, as before, expressly without instruction or authority from Mr. Lincoln.  They went to Richmond, and had an extended interview with Mr. Davis, during which they proposed to him a plan of adjustment as visionary as it was unauthorized, its central feature being a general election to be held over the whole country, North and South, within sixty days, on the two propositions,—­peace with disunion and Southern independence, or peace with Union, emancipation, no confiscation, and universal amnesty,—­the majority vote to decide, and the governments at Washington and Richmond to be finally bound by the decision.

The interview resulted in nothing but a renewed declaration from Mr. Davis that he would fight for separation to the bitter end—­a declaration which, on the whole, was of service to the Union cause, since, to a great extent, it stopped the clamor of the peace factionists during the presidential campaign.  Not entirely, however.  There was still criticism enough to induce Henry J. Raymond, chairman of the executive committee of the Republican party, to write a letter on August 22, suggesting to Mr. Lincoln that he ought to appoint a commission in due form to make proffers of peace to Davis on the sole condition of acknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution; all other questions to be settled in a convention of the people of all the States.

Mr. Lincoln answered this patiently and courteously, framing, to give point to his argument, an experimental draft of instructions with which he proposed, in case such proffers were made, to send Mr. Raymond himself to the rebel authorities.  On seeing these in black and white, Raymond, who had come to Washington to urge his project, readily agreed with the President and Secretaries Seward, Stanton, and Fessenden, that to carry it out would be worse than losing the presidential contest:  it would be ignominiously surrendering it in advance.