He reached the outer defenses of Savannah on December 10, easily driving before him about ten thousand of the enemy.  On December 13, he stormed Fort McAllister, and communicated with the Union fleet through Ossabaw Sound, reporting to Washington that his march had been most agreeable, that he had not lost a wagon on the trip, that he had utterly destroyed over two hundred miles of rails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to Lee’s and Hood’s armies.  With pardonable exultation General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln on December 22: 

“I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition.  Also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton.”

He had reason to be gratified with the warm acknowledgment which President Lincoln wrote him in the following letter: 

“MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN:  Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift, the capture of Savannah.  When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that ‘nothing risked, nothing gained,’ I did not interfere.  Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce.  And taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is, indeed, a great success.  Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole—­Hood’s army—­it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.  But what next?  I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.  Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.”

It was again General Sherman who planned and decided the next step of the campaign.  Grant sent him orders to fortify a strong post, leave his artillery and cavalry, and bring his infantry by sea to unite with the Army of the Potomac before Petersburg.  Greatly to Sherman’s satisfaction, this order was soon revoked, and he was informed that Grant wished “the whole matter of your future actions should be left entirely to your own discretion.”  In Sherman’s mind, the next steps to be taken were “as clear as daylight.”  The progress of the war in the West could now be described step by step, and its condition and probable course be estimated with sound judgment.  The opening of the Mississippi River in the previous year had cut off from the rebellion the vast resources west of the great river.  Sherman’s Meridian campaign in February had rendered useless the railroads of the State of Mississippi.  The capture of Atlanta and the march to the sea had ruined the railroads of Georgia, cutting off another huge slice of Confederate resources.  The battles of Franklin and Nashville had practically annihilated the principal Confederate army in the West.  Sherman now proposed to Grant that he would subject the two Carolinas to the same process, by marching his army through the heart of them from Savannah to Raleigh.