That same night, Grant’s advance crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, and during another week, with a succession of marching, flanking, and fighting.  Grant pushed the Union army forward to Cold Harbor.  Here Lee’s intrenched army was again between him and Richmond, and on June 3, Grant ordered another determined attack in front, to break through that constantly resisting barrier.  But a disastrous repulse was the consequence.  Its effect upon the campaign is best given in Grant’s own letter, written to Washington on June 5: 

“My idea from the start has been to beat Lee’s army, if possible, north of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.  I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have.  They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind them.  Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city.”

During the week succeeding the severe repulse at Cold Harbor, which closed what may be summed up as Grant’s campaign against Richmond, he made his preparations to enter upon the second element of his general plan, which may be most distinctively denominated the siege of Petersburg, though, in fuller phraseology, it might be called the siege of Petersburg and Richmond combined.  But the amplification is not essential; for though the operation and the siege-works embraced both cities, Petersburg was the vital and vulnerable point.  When Petersburg fell, Richmond fell of necessity.  The reason was, that Lee’s army, inclosed within the combined fortifications, could only be fed by the use of three railroads centering at Petersburg; one from the southeast, one from the south, and one with general access from the southwest.  Between these, two plank roads added a partial means of supply.  Thus far, Grant’s active campaign, though failing to destroy Lee’s army, had nevertheless driven it into Richmond, and obviously his next step was either to dislodge it, or compel it to surrender.

Cold Harbor was about ten miles from Richmond, and that city was inclosed on the Washington side by two circles of fortifications devised with the best engineering skill.  On June 13, Grant threw forward an army corps across the Chickahominy, deceiving Lee into the belief that he was making a real direct advance upon the city; and so skilfully concealed his intention that by midnight of the sixteenth he had moved the whole Union army with its artillery and trains about twenty miles directly south and across the James River, on a pontoon bridge over two thousand feet long, to City Point.  General Butler, with an expedition