When the Army of the Potomac was ordered to be withdrawn it was clearly enough seen that the movement might put the Army of Virginia in jeopardy; but it was hoped that if the transfer to Acquia Creek and Alexandria were made as promptly as the order contemplated, the two armies would be united before the enemy could reach them.  McClellan, however, continued day after day to protest against the change, and made his preparations and embarkation with such exasperating slowness as showed that he still hoped to induce the government to change its plans.

Pope, despite the fact that he had managed his retreat with skill and bravery, was attacked by Lee’s army, and fought the second battle of Bull Run on August 30, under the disadvantage of having one of McClellan’s divisions entirely absent and the other failing to respond to his order to advance to the attack on the first day.  McClellan had reached Alexandria on August 24; and notwithstanding telegram after telegram from Halleck, ordering him to push Franklin’s division out to Pope’s support, excuse and delay seemed to be his only response, ending at last in his direct suggestion that Franklin’s division be kept to defend Washington, and Pope be left to “get out of his scrape” as best he might.

McClellan’s conduct and language had awakened the indignation of the whole cabinet, roused Stanton to fury, and greatly outraged the feelings of President Lincoln.  But even under such irritation the President was, as ever, the very incarnation of cool, dispassionate judgment, allowing nothing but the daily and hourly logic of facts to influence his suggestions or decision.  In these moments of crisis and danger he felt more keenly than ever the awful responsibilities of rulership, and that the fate of the nation hung upon his words and acts from hour to hour.

His official counselors, equally patriotic and sincere, were not his equals in calmness of temper.  On Friday, August 29, Stanton went to Chase, and after an excited conference drew up a memorandum of protest, to be signed by the members of the cabinet, which drew a gloomy picture of present and apprehended dangers, and recommended the immediate removal of McClellan from command.  Chase and Stanton signed the paper, as also did Bates, whom they immediately consulted, and somewhat later Smith added his signature.  But when they presented it to Welles, he firmly refused, stating that though he concurred with them in judgment, it would be discourteous and unfriendly to the President to adopt such a course.  They did not go to Seward and Blair, apparently believing them to be friendly to McClellan, and therefore probably unwilling to give their assent.  The refusal of Mr. Welles to sign had evidently caused a more serious discussion among them about the form and language of the protest; for on Monday, September 1, it was entirely rewritten by Bates, cut down to less than half its original length as drafted by Stanton, and once more signed by the same four members of the cabinet.