Upon the receipt of this alarming piece of news, President Lincoln instantly took additional measures of safety.  He sent a telegram to General Burnside in North Carolina to come with all the reinforcements he could spare to McClellan’s help.  Through the Secretary of War he instructed General Halleck at Corinth to send twenty-five thousand infantry to McClellan by way of Baltimore and Washington.  His most important action was to begin the formation of a new army.  On the same day he sent Secretary of State Seward to New York with a letter to be confidentially shown to such of the governors of States as could be hurriedly called together, setting forth his view of the present condition of the war, and his own determination in regard to its prosecution.  After outlining the reverse at Richmond and the new problems it created, the letter continued: 

“What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more.  A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection.  Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war.  I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is.”

Meanwhile, by the news of the victory of Malvern Hill and the secure position to which McClellan had retired at Harrison’s Landing, the President learned that the condition of the Army of the Potomac was not as desperate as at first had seemed.  The result of Seward’s visit to New York is shown in the President’s letter of July 2, answering McClellan’s urgent call for heavy reinforcements: 

“The idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd.  If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression.  I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me.  If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now.  Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can.  The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept.”

And in another letter, two days later: 

“To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible....  Under these circumstances, the defensive for the present must be your only care.  Save the army—­first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must.”