The President’s indignation was intense; and when, a little later, General Marcy, McClellan’s father-in-law and chief of staff, came in, Lincoln’s criticism of the affair was in sharper language than was his usual habit.

“Why, in the name of common sense,” said he, excitedly, “couldn’t the general have known whether canal-boats would go through that lock before he spent a million dollars getting them there?  I am almost despairing at these results.  Everything seems to fail.  The impression is daily gaining ground that the general does not intend to do anything.  By a failure like this we lose all the prestige gained by the capture of Fort Donelson.”

The prediction of the Secretary of War proved correct.  That same night, McClellan revoked Hooker’s authority to cross the lower Potomac and demolish the rebel batteries about the Occoquan River.  It was doubtless this Harper’s Ferry incident which finally convinced the President that he could no longer leave McClellan intrusted with the sole and unrestricted exercise of military affairs.  Yet that general had shown such decided ability in certain lines of his profession, and had plainly in so large a degree won the confidence of the Army of the Potomac itself, that he did not wish entirely to lose the benefit of his services.  He still hoped that, once actively started in the field, he might yet develop valuable qualities of leadership.  He had substantially decided to let him have his own way in his proposed campaign against Richmond by water, and orders to assemble the necessary vessels had been given before the Harper’s Ferry failure was known.

Early on the morning of March 8, the President made one more effort to convert McClellan to a direct movement against Manassas, but without success.  On the contrary, the general convened twelve of his division commanders in a council, who voted eight to four for the water route.  This finally decided the question in the President’s mind, but he carefully qualified the decision by two additional war orders of his own, written without consultation.  President’s General War Order No. 2 directed that the Army of the Potomac should be immediately organized into four army corps, to be respectively commanded by McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and a fifth under Banks.  It is noteworthy that the first three of these had always earnestly advocated the Manassas movement.  President’s General War Order No. 3 directed, in substance:  First.  An immediate effort to capture the Potomac batteries. Second.  That until that was accomplished not more than two army corps should be started on the Chesapeake campaign toward Richmond Third.  That any Chesapeake movement should begin in ten days; and—­Fourth.  That no such movement should be ordered without leaving Washington entirely secure.