The two generals, differing on some other points, agreed, however, in a memorandum prepared next day at the President’s request, that a direct movement against the Confederate army at Manassas was preferable to a movement by water against Richmond; that preparations for the former could be made in a week, while the latter would require a month or six weeks.  Similar discussions were held on the eleventh and twelfth, and finally, on January 13, by which date General McClellan had sufficiently recovered to be present.  McClellan took no pains to hide his displeasure at the proceedings, and ventured no explanation when the President asked what and when anything could be done.  Chase repeated the direct interrogatory to McClellan himself, inquiring what he intended doing with his army, and when he intended doing it.  McClellan stated his unwillingness to develop his plans, but said he would tell them if he was ordered to do so.  The President then asked him if he had in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be commenced.  McClellan replied that he had.  “Then,” rejoined the President, “I will adjourn this meeting.”

While these conferences were going on, a change occurred in the President’s cabinet; Secretary of War Cameron, who had repeatedly expressed a desire to be relieved from the onerous duties of the War Department, was made minister to Russia and Edwin M. Stanton appointed to succeed him.  Stanton had been Attorney-General during the last months of President Buchanan’s administration, and, though a lifelong Democrat, had freely conferred and cooeperated with Republican leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives in thwarting secession schemes.  He was a lawyer of ability and experience, and, possessing organizing qualities of a high degree combined with a strong will and great physical endurance, gave his administration of the War Department a record for efficiency which it will be difficult for any future minister to equal; and for which service his few mistakes and subordinate faults of character will be readily forgotten.  In his new functions, Stanton enthusiastically seconded the President’s efforts to rouse the Army of the Potomac to speedy and vigorous action.

In his famous report, McClellan states that very soon after Stanton became Secretary of War he explained verbally to the latter his plan of a campaign against Richmond by way of the lower Chesapeake Bay, and at Stanton’s direction also explained it to the President.  It is not strange that neither the President nor the new Secretary approved it.  The reasons which then existed against it in theory, and were afterward demonstrated in practice, are altogether too evident.  As this first plan was never reduced to writing, it may be fairly inferred that it was one of those mere suggestions which, like all that had gone before, would serve only to postpone action.