The sudden uprising in Maryland and the insurrectionary activity in Virginia had been largely stimulated by the dream of the leading conspirators that their new confederacy would combine all the slave States, and that by the adhesion of both Maryland and Virginia they would fall heir to a ready-made seat of government.  While the bombardment of Sumter was in progress, the rebel Secretary of War, announcing the news in a jubilant speech at Montgomery, in the presence of Jefferson Davis and his colleagues, confidently predicted that the rebel flag would before the end of May “float over the dome of the Capitol at Washington.”  The disloyal demonstrations in Maryland and Virginia rendered such a hope so plausible that Jefferson Davis telegraphed to Governor Letcher at Richmond that he was preparing to send him thirteen regiments, and added:  “Sustain Baltimore if practicable.  We reinforce you”; while Senator Mason hurried to that city personally to furnish advice and military assistance.

But the flattering expectation was not realized.  The requisite preparation and concert of action were both wanting.  The Union troops from New York and New England, pouring into Philadelphia, flanked the obstructions of the Baltimore route by devising a new one by way of Chesapeake Bay and Annapolis; and the opportune arrival of the Seventh Regiment of New York in Washington, on April 25, rendered that city entirely safe against surprise or attack, relieved the apprehension of officials and citizens, and renewed its business and public activity.  The mob frenzy of Baltimore and the Maryland towns subsided almost as quickly as it had risen.  The Union leaders and newspapers asserted themselves, and soon demonstrated their superiority in numbers and activity.

Serious embarrassment had been created by the timidity of Governor Hicks, who, while Baltimore remained under mob terrorism, officially protested against the landing of Union troops at Annapolis; and, still worse, summoned the Maryland legislature to meet on April 26—­a step which he had theretofore stubbornly refused to take.  This event had become doubly dangerous, because a Baltimore city election held during the same terror week had reinforced the legislature with ten secession members, creating a majority eager to pass a secession ordinance at the first opportunity.  The question of either arresting or dispersing the body by military force was one of the problems which the crisis forced upon President Lincoln.  On full reflection he decided against either measure.

“I think it would not be justifiable,” he wrote to General Scott, “nor efficient for the desired object. First, they have a clearly legal right to assemble; and we cannot know in advance that their action will not be lawful and peaceful.  And if we wait until they shall have acted, their arrest or dispersion will not lessen the effect of their action. Secondly, we cannot permanently prevent their action.  If we arrest them, we cannot