Why William H. Seward, who is fairly entitled to rank as a great statesman, should have written this memorandum and presented it to Mr. Lincoln, has never been explained; nor is it capable of explanation.  Its suggestions were so visionary, its reasoning so fallacious, its assumptions so unwarranted, its conclusions so malapropos, that it falls below critical examination.  Had Mr. Lincoln been an envious or a resentful man, he could not have wished for a better occasion to put a rival under his feet.

The President doubtless considered the incident one of phenomenal strangeness, but it did not in the least disturb his unselfish judgment or mental equipoise.  There was in his answer no trace of excitement or passion.  He pointed out in a few sentences of simple, quiet explanation that what the administration had done was exactly a foreign and domestic policy which the Secretary of State himself had concurred in and helped to frame.  Only, that Mr. Seward proposed to go further and give up Sumter.  Upon the central suggestion that some one mind must direct, Mr. Lincoln wrote with simple dignity: 

“If this must be done, I must do it.  When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the cabinet.”

Mr. Lincoln’s unselfish magnanimity is the central marvel of the whole affair.  His reply ended the argument.  Mr. Seward doubtless saw at once how completely he had put himself in the President’s power.  Apparently, neither of the men ever again alluded to the incident.  No other persons except Mr. Seward’s son and the President’s private secretary ever saw the correspondence, or knew of the occurrence.  The President put the papers away in an envelop, and no word of the affair came to the public until a quarter of a century later, when the details were published in Mr. Lincoln’s biography.  In one mind, at least, there was no further doubt that the cabinet had a master, for only some weeks later Mr. Seward is known to have written:  “There is but one vote in the cabinet, and that is cast by the President.”  This mastery Mr. Lincoln retained with a firm dignity throughout his administration.  When, near the close of the war, he sent Mr. Seward to meet the rebel commissioners at the Hampton Roads conference, he finished his short letter of instructions with the imperative sentence:  “You will not assume to definitely consummate anything.”

From this strange episode our narrative must return to the question of Fort Sumter.  On April 4, official notice was sent to Major Anderson of the coming relief, with the instruction to hold out till the eleventh or twelfth if possible; but authorizing him to capitulate whenever it might become necessary to save himself and command.  Two days later the President sent a special messenger with written notice to the governor of South Carolina that an attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that if such attempt were not resisted, no further effort would be made to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or unless in case of an attack on the fort.