therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe.  Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, that after her recent defeat seemed very doubtful.  These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a defensive nature, led to the great German military bills of the last two years.  Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength.

Whoever considers carefully the course of events that has been briefly sketched here will pronounce the assertion of our enemies, that Germany wanted the war, ridiculous and absurd.  On the contrary, it can be said that Germany never before endeavored more eagerly to preserve peace than during the last few years.  Germany had plenty of opportunities to attack and good opportunities to boot, for we knew for years that the army of France was no more ready than that of Russia.  But the Germans are not a warlike nation and the German Emperor, with his Government, has always shown how earnestly he meant his reiterated assertions that the preservation of peace was his principal aim.  He was actuated in this by general considerations of humanity, justice, and culture, as well as by the consideration of the German trade and commerce.  This, especially the transoceanic commerce of Germany, has increased from year to year.  War, however, means the ruin of commerce.  Why expose Germany needlessly to this terrible risk, especially as everything in Germany prospered and her wealth increased?  No, the German Army bills were merely meant to protect us against, and prepare us for, the attacks of Muscovite barbarism.  But nobody in Germany has ever doubted for a moment that France would attack us at the first Russian signal.  Since the first days of the Franco-Russian alliance things have become entirely reversed.  Then France wanted to win Russia for a war of revenge against Germany; now, on the contrary, France thought herself obliged to place her power and her existence at the disposal of the Russian lust of conquest.

In the Spring of 1914 the German press reported from St. Petersburg detailed accounts of Russia’s comprehensive preparations for war.  They were not denied in Russia, and Paris declared that Russia would be ready in two or three years and then pursue a policy corresponding to her power; France, too, would then be at the height of her power.  If the German Government had desired war, on the strength of these accounts, which were true, it could have waged a preventive war at once and easily.  It did not do so, considering that a war is just only when it is forced upon one by the enemy.  Thus Spring went by with the atmosphere at high tension.  From St. Petersburg and Paris overbearing threats came in increasing numbers to the effect that the power of the Dual Alliance was now gigantic and that Germany and Austria soon would begin to feel it.  We remained quiet and watchful, endeavoring with perseverance and with all our might to win over Great Britain to the policy of preserving peace.  Colonial and economic questions were being discussed by the German and English Governments, and the cordiality between the two great powers seemed only to be equaled by their mutual confidence.