If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest.  In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood.  On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows: 

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support.  In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.  Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.—­(British “White Paper” No. 151.)

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world.  The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders: 

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty’s Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power and that his Majesty’s Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty’s Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.—­(British “White Paper” No. 155.)

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany.  Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany.  Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor.  On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England’s neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium’s neutrality.  On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage.

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons:  the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive.  However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of—­the small nations.