Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon: 

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved....  M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.  I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement....  I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.—­(British “White Paper” No. 119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct.  If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more.  Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever.  This is proved by Grey’s conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador: 

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.  I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be....  The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral.  I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise.... (British “White Paper” No. 123.)

Belgium Not the Cause.

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided.  The violation of Belgium’s neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany’s enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London: 

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.—­(British “White Paper” No. 148.)

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position “to settle