Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement.  A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons.  M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attache in London, Capt.  Wolkow.  As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey’s “Twisty” Answer.

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them.  It was noted how twisty Grey’s answer was.  He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation.  “As far as he was able to judge the matter,” no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war.  In the light of the following revelation of Grey’s agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement.  The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies’ interest as far as England is concerned.

A German “Attack.”

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia.  Neither of these things would France admit.—­(British “White Paper” No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German “attack,” which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free.  He told the Frenchman: 

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider....  We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.—­(British “White Paper” No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British “White Paper” No. 105.)