I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise....—­(British “White Paper” No. 87.)

Stirring Up Trouble.

On the German side Grey’s open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness.  Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow: 

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.—­(British “White Paper” No. 98.)

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly.  On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports: 

He [Poincare] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the hands of Great Britain.  If his Majesty’s Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.—­(British “White Paper” No. 99.)

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat.  In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British “White Paper” No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words: 

His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.  What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.  From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy.  Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with