This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Charge d’Affaires de l’Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis.  Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on.  The Belgian diplomatist writes: 

     It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in
     Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to
     forestall a general conflict....

And after M. de l’Escaille has told that Russia—­what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—­was mobilizing its own army, he continues: 

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have even received assurances in that direction, that England and France will stay by them.  This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey’s pretended “attempts at mediation.”  The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim.  “The exertion of pressure upon Berlin” included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey’s own explanations.  On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information.  He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen: 

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind.  The situation was very grave....  But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action....  But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid.—­(British “White Paper” No. 89.)

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure.  Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England: