In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great powers’ united action, [des actions conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.—­(Russian “Orange Paper” No. 17.)

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph.  Russia’s real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government: 

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action.  There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.—­(British “White Paper” No. 54.)

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more.  On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows: 

     In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method
     that Germany thought possible if only Germany would “press the
     button in the interests of peace.”—­(British “White Paper” No. 84.)

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war.  On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace.  Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt.  Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows: 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance.  Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it....  Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed.  In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.—­(British “White Paper” No. 78.)

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naivete of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia’s ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.