Russian Sincerity Questioned.

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter.  But did Russia really want the conference?  Minister Sazonof declares: 

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions which I hope may be favorable.  I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.—­(British “White Paper” No. 53.)

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians.  Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately.  As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.[03]

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British “White Paper” No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg: 

His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.—­(British “White Paper” No. 55.)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman.  The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy.  Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg: 

... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia’s integrity and independence....  In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points....—­(British “White Paper” No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there: 

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence.  He said that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.—­(British “White Paper” No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia’s real intentions?  He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees.  It is the same duplicity