of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence.  These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear.  The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914.  There the most important spots of Bunsen’s report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows: 

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany’s efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communique, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany’s Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned.  But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German Military Attache upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German “White Paper”) that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered.  Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German “White Paper,” Page 18, of new York times reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria’s preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.