On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was forced on her.  Austria’s action was in reality directed against Russia.  She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there.  He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours.  If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war.  If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war....

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once!  His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war.  He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.—­(British “White Paper” No. 17.)

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined.  Sazonof’s conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia’s dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this.  The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the “White Paper” does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict.  In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.—­(British “White Paper,” No, 44.)

Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings.  On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor: