I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me.  I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty’s Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty’s Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms.  Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.—­(British “White Paper” No. 6.)

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria.  The following was the answer: 

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question....

The dispatch continues: 

     French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a
     declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty’s Government with
     French and Russian Governments.... (British “White Paper” No. 6.)

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24—­it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the “White Paper”—­concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression.

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have made things plain.  Russia’s aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war.  Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England’s interest in the kingdom on the Save as “nil.”  Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this “little nation,” although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its’ history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.