But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House.  If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean?  If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them.  If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean.  We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it?  Let us assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, “No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict.”  Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—­which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—­in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—­let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we shall go to war; and let us assume—­which is quite possible—­that Italy, who is now neutral—­because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—­let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital British interests ourselves to fight—­what then will be the position in the Mediterranean?  It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country.  What will be our position then?  We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean.  It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk.  I say that from the point of view of British interests.  We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—­and to know at once—­whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support.  In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement: