I come first, now, to the question of British obligations.  I have assured the House—­and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—­that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor upon the country.  I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past.  The Triple Entente was not an alliance—­it was a diplomatic group.  The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—­also a Balkan crisis—­originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out.  I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support.  More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—­up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support.  Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House.  I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906.  That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty’s Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—­spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—­was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support.  I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose.  I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—­a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—­that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.