by artillery were sent along the causeway.  Suspecting something in regard to torpedoes, they drove before them as a sort of advance guard about two hundred and fifty horses without riders, it being the duty of the poor animals to take the shock of the explosion should torpedoes be placed on the beach.  And so they did, for, on the horses passing the spot where the torpedoes were placed, an explosion took place through which several horses were killed.  The rest turned right back, and the causeway being very narrow, dashed amongst the advancing troops, causing the greatest confusion, so much so that the whole party had to retreat and we saw them no more.

It is true that one of the small ironclads had about got the range of the advancing enemy along the sea-beach, so making their position rather precarious, but I believe that the real cause of the failure was the action of the horses.

In the meantime, the light draft Russian gun-boats came down the river, and began to fire shell and shot at a long range at the small town and fortifications of Sulina.  This was answered by the temporary batteries alone, the ships being out of range.  Desultory fighting went on for about twenty-four hours, when the Russians, finding the hopelessness of the enterprise, especially now that the troops had retired, gave it up as a bad job and steamed up the Danube again.  This was the only serious attack made upon Sulina, which Russia could never have taken and held till she had destroyed the Turkish fleet.  After this I went to Batoum, which place Dervish Pasha was gallantly holding against Russia.  He was sadly in want of naval help, as the Russians had advanced by the sea-shore to within six miles of that much-coveted port.  On arriving there I took the command of eight Turkish ships of war, besides transports that were constantly coming and going between Constantinople and Batoum with provisions, ammunition, &c., for the army and navy.  Here, again, if the Russians could have disposed of the Turkish fleet they would have easily taken Batoum.  By commanding the sea, even with a couple of vessels, they would have prevented supplies being sent.  It must be remembered there was no way of supporting the soldiers and sailors except by sea.  My first object was to drive the Russians, by the fire of the ships, more inland.  This was easy enough, as of course the enemy had no guns with them to compare in range with those on board the ironclads.  Some time after my arrival, however, they brought down two fifteen centimetre Krupp guns from Ardahan, guns that had a considerably longer range than our twelve-ton Armstrongs.  They gave us some trouble; however, the position of the attacking camp was changed so as to be out of range of our guns, a move in every way satisfactory to the Turkish military commander.  This action of our fleet gave great annoyance to the enemy, and it was determined if possible to make our lying at Batoum a dangerous if not impossible